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Abstract

Civil litigation typically ends when the parties compromise. While existing theories of
settlement primarily focus on information exchange, we instead examine how motion
practice, especially non-discovery motions, can substantially shape parties’ knowledge
about their cases and thereby influence the timing of settlement. Using docket-level
federal district court data, we find a number of strong effects regarding how motions can
influence this process, including that the filing of a motion significantly speeds case
settlement, that granted motions are more immediately critical to settlement timing than
motions denied, and that plaintiff victories have a stronger effect than defendant victories.
These results provide a uniquely detailed look at the mechanism of compromise via
information exchange and motion practice in litigation while simultaneously yielding
evidence that this effect goes well beyond the traditionally studied discovery process.
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A generation of interdisciplinary legal scholars has worked to understand settlement’s
propriety, timing, incidence, and causes. This attention is not surprising given that most filed civil
cases settle (Galanter, 2004; Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009). Indeed, settlement within formal
litigation is but a part of an attenuated dispute resolution process which may entail several rounds of
pre-complaint negotiation and continue well after the “case” has formally terminated (Clermont and
Eisenberg, 2002). Galanter (1985) minced no words when describing the landscape of disputes:
“[T]he negotiated settlement of civil cases is not a marginal phenomenon; it is not an innovation; it
is not some unusual alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation”
(1).
Lawsuits begin with many known unknowns. A single filed complaint may advance multiple,
often competing, theories and causes of action. The plaintiff needs to have only a reasonable belief
that her version of the facts is accurate, and along the way she will likely rely on discovery to know
whether that faith is defensible. Though individual defendants might be expected to know what
they’ve done, entities will have to devote time to investigation before knowing what – if anything –
actually happened. The court’s perspective on the relevant doctrine may at times be predictable, but
its view of the facts will likely be shaped by factors both remote from the merits and exceedingly
difficult to observe. Even if the parties were not already adversely positioned, such informational
gaps and barriers present formidable hurdles to the agreement of the parties and the settlement of
their cases (Priest and Klein, 1984).
What then can explain how cases progress toward settlement? The empirical evidence has
frustrated those hoping to find a conclusive answer to this question. The settlement “rate” – the
overall chance that a case in a given dataset will settle – varies by jurisdiction, case type, time,
lawyering, judicial demographics and party characteristics (Eisenberg and Lanvers, 2009). But this
heterogeneity may obscure the role that information exchange through motion practice plays in
3

motivating settlement in individual disputes. Indeed, one of just a handful of factors that distinguish
formal litigation from dispute resolution outside of courts is that it provides the parties with a
powerful tool – litigant-controlled motions – that enables them to force the exchange of
information. In short, motion practice makes litigation dynamic and reflexive, permitting parties1 to
learn about their cases (Kritzer, 1986).
In the case of discovery, that learning process is direct. It is therefore not surprising that
much of the scholarship examining litigant learning and settlement, theoretical and empirical alike,
has focused on the possible effect of discovery on case settlement (e.g., Shavell, 1989; Farber and
White, 1991; Huang, 2007). While discovery practice is the most salient way that this intra-litigation
information exchange and learning takes place, the filing and resolution of other motions produces
two additional sources of information: how the filing party understands the facts and law – their
strategy for the case – and how committed they are to the case – the kind of resources they are
willing to expend. When the court is induced to rule, even when that ruling does not end the case,
the parties gain a fourth source of information – what the court thinks about the legal merits and
facts. Because most accounts of settlement begin by assuming that it is uncertainty and/or
asymmetric information about cases that prevents compromise (Bebchuk, 1984; Priest and Klein,
1984), the process of litigation can be a way in which education toward compromise happens.
In this study, we seek to further examine this progression of cases toward settlement by
testing the effect of the filing and disposition of motions on the timing of settlement. We begin in
section 1 by developing a theory and five hypotheses for how information exchange through
motions practice is likely to motivate case settlement in certain trial court cases. In particular, we
expect that motion filing, content, and outcome, and movant identity may affect settlement timing in
a case. In section 2, we detail our data and methodology for carrying out our empirical tests. As we
describe there, this study utilizes an original dataset of 585 cases filed in federal district courts in
4

which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil, thereby holding a defendant business entity’s
individual owners liable beyond the company itself. To empirically analyze time to settlement in
these cases (while accounting for both other, non-settlement termination methods and ongoing
cases), we estimate a series of competing risks duration models (one for each motion-specific
hypothesis) in section 3. After doing so, we find, among other things, that the mere filing of a
motion in a case hastens settlement. In short, the time to settlement can be influenced by the
dynamic characteristics of the litigation preceding it. In sections 4 and 5, we discuss the significance
of these results, including how they provide a controlled and uniquely detailed look at the
mechanism of compromise via information exchange and litigation in the federal courts while also
yielding evidence that this effect goes well beyond the traditionally studied discovery process.
1.

Theory & Hypotheses
Early modeling of settlement, consisting largely of economics-based theoretical accounts,

focused on how the interaction of the parties’ subjective probabilities of victory, divergent
expectations, error-prone calculations of their likelihood of success, and asymmetrical information,
along with the cases’ stakes and costs of litigation affect settlement rates (Posner, 1973; Priest and
Klein, 1984; Bebchuk, 1984). This research generally predicted that the farther apart the opposing
litigants were in terms of these metrics, the less likely they should be to settle.
Over time, research has ventured to test these theoretical models quantitatively. This work
has found that factors such as, for example, the parties’ experience and status (Waldfogel, 1998),
case importance or severity (Landes, 1971; Elder, 1989), and repeat attorney interaction (Johnston
and Waldfogel, 2002) can all play a systematic role in predicting the likelihood of case settlement.
One notable line of this empirical research focuses on the specific effect of discovery in reducing
informational uncertainties and asymmetries and thereby promoting case settlement. As Farber and
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White (1991) put it, “[t]he two-way exchange of information during the discovery process
encourages resolution of cases without trial by making the information available to both sides more
alike and by increasing the likelihood that both parties have the same expectation about the trial
outcome” (201). Quantitative work, including studies of medical malpractice cases in U.S. litigation
(Farber and White, 1991) and general Taiwanese civil lawsuits (Huang, 2007), provides strong
support for this discovery-settlement effect.
Scholars have also considered, though to a much lesser degree, the duration of litigation and
timing of case settlement. They find, for example, that institutionalized legal rules, such as those
involving fee-shifting and fee structures (Fournier and Zuehlke, 1996; Helland and Tabarrok, 2003),
comparative negligence rules (Kessler, 1996), and liability standards (Chang and Sigman, 2000) can
influence the time to case termination and settlement.
Due largely to data limitations, only a small handful of settlement-timing empirical pieces
have begun to make a connection between information exchange and the timing of case settlement.
Spurr (1997) finds, for example, that cases settle more quickly when they have been referred to a
settlement specialist during the litigation. Johnston and Waldfogel (2002) discover an effect on
settlement timing due to the repeat interaction of attorneys and their corresponding ability to reach
swifter litigation compromises. Similarly, Fenn and Rickman (1999) find strong effects on
settlement timing based on parties’ costs and liability calculations, as well as on the presence of legal
aid. Kotkin (2007) finds that settlement amount increases after the filing of a motion. These articles
certainly advance our understanding of this process but are also, understandably, limited by
litigation-specific variables that are measured at one point in time (usually case filing or settlement).
Following in the footsteps of this work on settlement timing, we seek now to gain a better
theoretical understanding of the micro-level dynamics of litigation and how this affects when in the
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life of a dispute settlement is likely to happen. Settlement, as we have discussed, can occur at any
moment after injury and takes different forms. It need not entail a transfer of wealth from the
offending party to the disputant, and, famously, is almost always privately concluded without judicial
intervention or sanction.2 Indeed, most disputes are resolved via formal or informal compromise
prior to the filing of a complaint, as the injured party either bears its losses or the injurer makes a
pre-filing payment (Aubert, 1967; Miller and Sarat, 1980-81; Trubek et al., 1983).
When the parties fail to settle during the early stages of dispute resolution, injured parties can
initiate formal proceedings.3 There are, we suggest, two general kinds of cases that meet this
threshold. The first are ones in which the parties, through shared experiences or pre-filing
communication, share an understanding of the facts and the putative plaintiff's damages. However,
they have disagreed as to whether the plaintiff has the resources, or motivation, to escalate the
dispute and pursue litigation. To borrow a poker parlance, the defendant believes that the plaintiff
is bluffing in his threat to involve the courts. The complaint is a response, turning up the Aces in
the plaintiff's hand (Clermont et al., 2010). Such cases are likely to end quite early in the life of a
lawsuit, ordinarily without resorting to the formal litigation process (Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985;
Nielsen et al., 2010).
In other cases, there has been relatively little interaction between the parties, or at least they
have not had the number and quality of discussions necessary to close the informational gaps
between them. Because of this, the parties remain divided at case filing by their views of the facts or
the legal merits. As has been classically described, such cases are marked by asymmetrically held
information (Farber and White, 1991). For compromise or settlement to become a reality,
information exchange is crucial. While remaining mindful of the existence of the former group of
filed cases (the “early settler, no litigation activity” lawsuits), we focus here primarily on this latter
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group of cases, an emphasis that allows us to more closely examine the relationship between
information exchange and the timing of settlement once formal litigation commences.
To do this, we turn first to behavioral psychology, which provides an explanation for why
cases in this latter group do not and should not settle at an even rate over time. Korobkin and
Guthrie (1994), Rachlinski (1996), Guthrie (2000), and Korobkin (2002) have argued that
individuals’ settlement decisions are influenced by their reference points. The simple version of the
theory is that plaintiffs view the choice between settlement and non-settlement as between two
gains, one certain and one contingent. Defendants, who can only lose money in litigation, see two
losses, with settlement being certain and trial merely possible. Given that choice, says prospect
theory, plaintiffs should be risk averse and prefer settlement (the sure over the uncertain gain) while
defendants should be risk seeking and prefer trial, even if the parties agree on what the relevant
probabilities are (Rachlinski, 1996).
As later work has explored, this reference setting can be complicated: if the plaintiff sees the
litigation through the lens of how it looked before any injury, “gains” in settlement may actually feel
like losses, and thus these uncompensated plaintiffs will prefer rolling the dice (Korobkin and
Guthrie, 1994). What is clear is that these reference points may change during the life of a lawsuit.
Plaintiffs may adapt to the losses they have suffered (Bronsteen et al., 2008). Or the defendant, who
we have assumed views the lawsuit as all loss, may see a preliminary ruling from a judge validating its
position in part as a psychological victory: settlement preserves the gain (or at least avoids the loss).
Thus, as the litigation develops, the parties’ basic orientation – “I’m currently ahead, the future is a
choice between types of losses” or “I’m currently behind, the future can only be better” – can shift,
and the shifts may be dramatic. These reference point changes will influence the settlement rate.4
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Also relevant here is a distinct theory that relies on rational litigants but also incorporates
insights from the valuation of options. Real options theory posits that the parties update their
expectations about the variance of outcomes that might result from litigation, based on information
coming from the court and from the other parties (Grundfest and Huang, 2006). As variance
increases, the “option” to remain in the lawsuit becomes significantly more valuable; as it decreases,
so does the value of the option and therefore the amount that the party would demand in
settlement.
Notably, both psychological and real options theory depend on the parties updating their
views of the case as it develops. This learning process relies crucially on the actions of the parties in
filing motions. Consider the parties’ settlement posture before the filing of a motion to dismiss.
They have asymmetric information about the facts, but are symmetrically unclear on how the court
will respond to the uncertain legal theories, particularly if they have not litigated the issue before
their assigned judge or magistrate in previous litigation. If the defendant does not make a motion,
the playing field for settlement will be unchanged (or very close to unchanged) after the filing of the
complaint.5 Factors present at filing will dominate settlement’s incidence and timing.
If the parties do engage in motion practice, the informational content of the case changes –
even before the other party has a chance to respond and the court to rule. As we have suggested,
motion practice provides at least four distinct kinds of information to the parties.6
The first – and most intuitive and commonly studied – is factual. A motion to compel, if
granted, forces the disgorgement of documents or testimony from one party, updating the other
party and reducing information asymmetries. Similarly, the documents appended to motions, even if
previously disclosed, can highlight for a party the facts which search costs might have otherwise
obscured (Huang, 2007). Of course, almost all factual discovery occurs without motion practice, as
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the parties exchange documents, take depositions, and answer interrogatories without any court
intervention. Indeed, motions to compel probably indicate that the ordinary mechanisms of
information exchange have broken down. Factual discovery, with or without court intervention, is the
form of information exchange that most empirical scholars to date have focused on, and it is a very
important driver of settlement.
But discovery is not the only way that formal litigation can inspire compromise. A second
kind of information is strategic. The filing of a motion to dismiss, for instance, tells the plaintiff
about the defendant’s perspective on the case, including, for example, the cases that he will rely on
throughout the litigation and his theory of non-liability. The responsive brief similarly informs the
defendant about the plaintiff’s view of the law. Because various theories have distinct probabilities
of relief – and require the parties to expend different amounts of resources – this opportunity for
strategic learning is precious.
The third source of information is the kind of resources the parties wish to spend on the case.
Learning about resource allocation is indirect and turns in part on the degree of polish on the
papers. Did the party spend money to be sure that the brief was carefully cite- and fact-checked, the
tabs pointing to the appropriate exhibits, the writing especially clear, and the arguments freshly
generated? Lawyers probably know, looking at a brief, whether the other side is going all out to win
the particular motion, or has made a filing in the usual course. This resourcing decision, in turn, can
update the parties’ views of how much the case is worth, the likelihood of protracted litigation, and
the other side’s reservation value in bargaining. Indeed, the mere filing of a motion may force a
party to expend resources in response that it would rather have conserved. Motion practice thus
may signal a party's commitment to the litigation.
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Fourth, motion practice may produce information about the judge. When the court rules,
assuming that it passes on dismissing the action entirely, the parties learn a tremendous amount
about how the court sees the case. Does the court see a nuisance suit, scorned and humbled, but
sent through to discovery? Will the judge be closely involved with the merits, pruning claims away?
Which issues are set up for resolution at summary judgment, and what standards does the court
provide about the scope of discovery? (Kritzer, 1986)
These four kinds of informational exchange imply that different kinds of motions, made by
various parties, resolved or left pending by the judge, at distinct times, will have different kinds of
influence on the amount of total information available. This leads us to our hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: The filing of a motion will increase settlement speed
As we have explained, the mere filing of a motion should bring the parties to the bargaining
table, by motivating learning and the updating of the parties’ subjective beliefs.7 Filing a motion
implicates each of the first three sources of information exchange – strategy, resources, and facts. Thus,
regardless of the disposition of the motion (granted or denied, in whole or part, or pending), we
expect to see an uptick in the rate of settlement following its filing.
Hypothesis 2: Granted motions will increase the settlement speed rate more than denied motions
Substantive motions that do not end the case – e.g., a plaintiff’s motion to certify a class or a
defendant’s motion for partial dismissal or partial summary judgment – can be granted or denied.
When granted, we would expect that the court will provide more information to the parties than if
the court denied the motion, if only because the decision to say “no” may mean “not yet.” There is
also evidence that denied motions to dismiss are almost never explained in written opinions
(Hoffman et al., 2007). Thus, the amount of information conveyed by a judge in a granted motion
will often exceed the amount of information conveyed by a judge in a denied motion.
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Hypothesis 3: Plaintiff interstitial victories will prompt faster settlement than defendant victories
At judgment, defendants generally win more cases than plaintiffs do – a function of multiple
factors, including selection, disparities in resources, the burden of proof, and anti-plaintiff bias
(Siegelman and Donohue, 1995). For example, Parker (2006) found that racially based employment
discrimination cases settled after plaintiff motion-level victories more often than after defendant
motion-level victories, while Kaplan et al. (2008) found that plaintiffs recovered more in settlement
than they did at trial and that workers whose claims were exaggerated tended to settle less often.
This suggests that when plaintiffs do win at the interstitial stage (i.e., a victory that does not end the
case) such wins will be more informative - in the sense of revealing the real strength of the plaintiff's
case - than when the defendants win such intermediate motions. In our dataset, consisting of veil
piercing cases, we have an additional reason to expect this result: plaintiff interstitial victories will
make it more likely that individual defendants' personal assets will be exposed to a liability judgment.
Given that defendants' prior expectations in such cases is that their personal assets will be protected
by the entity's veil, any plaintiff success will be likely to provide an important and highly salient new
piece of information about the case's settlement value.
Hypothesis 4: Motions that turn on the application of law to fact will be more likely to influence settlement than those
that are resolved on the pleadings
The informational content of dispositions is likely to increase over time, as the factual
picture develops and the judge pays more attention to the case.8 In part, this is a function of
incentives: judges have a limited amount of time to spend on a given case and rationally will choose
to do so in the factual position best developed for review and which is most likely to face an
appellate challenge. Therefore, as compared to motions resolved on the pleadings (such as motions
to dismiss, arbitrate, remand, or strike), motions that turn on application of law to fact (e.g.,
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summary judgment, class certification, evidentiary rulings, and patent construction) will likely
contain more information because the court has devoted more resources to their production. Being
more informative, such resolutions will decisively influence the settlement process (Rave, 2006).
Hypothesis 5: Motions seeking clarification of particularly uncertain law will be more likely to influence settlement
timing than motions seeking clarification of certain law
Since our theory depends on the positive influence of learning, we expect that motions
targeting legal issues that are generally thought to be difficult or obscure will have a greater influence
on settlement than motions targeting doctrines the parties know better. Our dataset examines veil
piercing cases, an area of law famously decried as “rare, severe, and unprincipled” (Easterbrook and
Fischel, 1985) and an “unprincipled hodgepodge of seemingly ad hoc and unpredictable results”
(Millon, 2007). In our data, we can distinguish between motions that ask judges to resolve an issue
related to piercing the veil – such as veil piercing specific discovery, or a motion to dismiss targeted
at the veil piercing allegation – from motions that are not so specifically focused. We expect that
veil specific motions, because they potentially resolve a particularly uncertain doctrine, will have a
more significant influence on the settlement rate than ordinary litigation practice.
We contend that these five motion-related hypotheses are causal in nature, since they meet
the standard articulated by Holland (1986): “[t]he key notion . . . is the potential (regardless of whether
it can be achieved in practice or not) for exposing each unit to the action of a cause” (946).
Although concerns regarding correlation and reverse causation are inescapable in observational data
studies like ours (Winship and Morgan, 1999), we are inclined to discount that objection for our
central hypotheses.9 With Hypotheses 1, for example, we expect that the filing of a substantive
motion in a case, and the resulting information that it puts into circulation among the case actors,
can cause the moment of settlement in the case to move up. The reverse of this, that imminent
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settlement causes motion practice and information exchange, is untenable since, as our cases without
any motions or litigation activity reveal (discussed in further detail below), engaging in post-filing
motion practice is not the most efficient way to settle cases when the parties have already
approached a fully informed compromise position.10
We are less certain about the causal story for one particular kind of motion – those
concerning discovery. Discovery motions can either seek to prevent disclosure (a motion for a
protective order) or, more commonly, prompt it (a motion to compel). Thus, some granted
discovery motions will enable crucial information exchange – for example, an order that denies a
privilege claim and requires the disclosure of a particularly damaging document. But, more typically,
discovery motions signal that the parties are failing to exchange information as they would in the
ordinary case. This raises a problem not of causation but of selection.11 Thus, it is very hard to
know what inferences to draw from the filing or the grant of a discovery motion.12 It is for this
reason that we separately control for these motions.
2.

Data & Methods
To test our hypotheses, we examined federal trial court litigation, from case filing through

settlement. We collected cases in which plaintiffs sought to pierce the corporate veil: the database
contains 697 separate district court cases filed from 2000 to 2005, a 78% random sample of all
eligible and available federal veil piercing cases within this period. To meet our criteria of “eligible
and available” and be included in our sampling population, a case’s complaint had to be present in
Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database, 13 filed in a federal district court,14 and include at least one veil
piercing claim.15 We exclude from this sample 112 cases that terminate via default judgment,
bankruptcy, remand, and transfer or that contain lengthy, non-terminal stays.16 Of the remaining 585
cases, we focus primarily on the 452 that terminate via settlement.17
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For coding events, parties, and activity in each case, we utilized the pleadings, the docket,
and any other relevant case documents electronically attached to the docket.18 After gathering the
primary pleading from Westlaw, we turned to PACER (“Public Access to Court Electronic
Resources”) to retrieve the case docket and other case documents.
This dataset of veil piercing lawsuits consists largely of commercial disputes between at least
three represented parties. In most such suits, the plaintiff advances a contract or commercial tort
claim against a defendant corporation and its owners, seeking to impose liability both against the
company (which may or may not be judgment proof) and the individuals. The veil piercing claim
thus operates as a derivative and remedial measure, much like a punitive damages allegation, rather
than as a substantively significant cause of action.
While our data were identified based on the inclusion of a veil piercing claim, two different
metrics indicate that our underlying cases represent a broad array of lawsuits. First, and not
surprisingly, the complaints serving as the origin for our data contain a wide variety of causes of
action, including tort, contract, RICO, ERISA, and common law fraud claims. In addition, the cases
in our data span a number of Nature of Suit (NOS) codes. At the time of filing, the filing party
identifies a single NOS code for the case, which serves as a snapshot of what the filer believes best
summarizes the case. Within empirical legal research, scholars frequently use these codes to identify
case issue areas (e.g., Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999; Johnston and Waldfogel, 2002; Galanter,
2004). Figure 1 depicts the NOS code distribution for all cases filed in federal district courts (black
bars; measured in 2007) and the distribution of codes within our dataset (gray bars). While our data
are certainly not representative of all filed cases (as measured by NOS code distribution), we can see
that nearly all major NOS categories are present, with the one real notable exception being prisoner
petition lawsuits. Not surprisingly, the overall NOS distribution of our data is highly suggestive of a
set of commercial litigation cases. Despite this variability in NOS codes and causes of action,
15

however, we remain cognizant of the fact that our data are limited in their scope and generalizability,
a topic that we return to further in the discussion section below.
To operationalize our hypotheses, we required information on the timing of cases as well as
on the motions, the parties, the judges, and other case characteristics. Our dependent variable of
interest throughout this study, time to settlement, is measured as the number of months that a case is
pending (“survives”) from its date of filing through the date of settlement. Summary statistics on
case survival time as well as on our other variables are reported in Table 1. As the table indicates,
cases in our data survive between 1 and 58 months, with a mean survival time of nearly 17 months.
<COMP: Place Figure 1 about here>>
<COMP: Place Table 1 about here>>

To empirically analyze time to settlement, we use a series of duration models. Our model of
choice, the competing risks regression model (Fine and Gray, 1999), allows us to estimate the effect
that individual case variables have on the time to case settlement. The model accounts for
alternative (competing) termination modalities besides settlement, like trials and dispositive motions.
Because the effect of case characteristics on settlement may depend on the existence of these other
possible methods of case termination, failure to account for these non-settlement terminations may
bias our results (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). Competing risk models resolve this concern
and, for this reason, have been used in other litigation-related duration work as well (Eisenberg and
Farber, 1997).19
A competing risks model also allows us to account for censored data. Due to inherent
limitations from studying relatively recent filings, some cases in our dataset had not terminated by
the time we finished collecting data. The competing risks model is well designed to treat these type
of censored data and avoid the bias inherent in dropping these cases altogether from the study.
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Within our data, the 29 cases not terminated by August 18, 2008 are included but, because they have
not yet “failed” (but still hold the potential to do so going forward), are censored.
Our key independent variables revolve around the motion activity in our cases. Our
measurement of each motion is discrete and time varying in nature. We capture these motions
through two mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive dichotomous variables: (1) one for the
first month after the motion is filed (or resolved, depending on the motion) and (2) one for the set
of all months thereafter (i.e., the second through the nth month) until the case ultimately terminates.
This measurement strategy allows us to more precisely capture the potential propelling effect (often
referred to as the hazard ratio) that motions may (or may not) have on cases as they move toward
settlement.
Because of this research design and the time-varying nature of these variables, our dataset is
constructed in an expanded format, where each month of each case has its own observation. As a
result, while we have 585 cases, our dataset contains 9,931 case-month observations.20
Motion made measures the presence of substantive (non-discovery) motions in a case,
regardless of how and whether those motions are resolved. Motion granted and motion denied measure
the type of outcome for resolved, substantive motions in a case. Plaintiff motion granted and defendant
motion granted quantify the presence of granted substantive motions where either a plaintiff or a
defendant was the moving party. Application of law to fact motion denied and pleading-based motion denied
measure the existence of denied motions in these two categories, where motions of the former type
include summary judgment, class certification, discovery, evidentiary rulings and patent construction
and motions in the latter group include motions to dismiss, arbitrate, remand, or strike.21 Finally, veil
piercing motion made and non-veil piercing motion made capture the presence of substantive motions that
either do or do not center primarily on the veil piercing claim(s) in the case. As we note above, we
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also separately control for discovery motion made. Each of these variables is coded as 1 when the
motion and/or outcome of interest is present and 0 otherwise. Any time more than one such type of
motion and/or outcome happens in a case, we record the first occurring instance.
In addition to our motion-level variables, we also control for a number of other variables
concerning case actors, type, and strength that may affect the timing of case settlement or other
termination.
Galanter (1974) sparked a large body of theoretical and empirical research examining the
effects that litigant status and differences in resources due to that status have on the litigation
process. The common argument (and empirical support) goes that imbalances in the resources and
power of opposing litigants will leave the weak in a position of disadvantage and will lead to
disproportionate outcomes for the stronger party (e.g., Kritzer and Silbey, 2003; Collins, 2004;
Schwab and Heise, 2011; Black and Boyd, 2012). To measure this, we look for cases where the
plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is an entity, contrasting such uneven matchups to cases
where both plaintiff and defendant are entities.22 Therefore, entity v. entity measures cases where both
the plaintiff(s) and the defendant(s) in the lawsuit are entities. Any time an individual party is
involved on either side of this dispute (as evidenced through the case docket and pleadings), this
variable is coded as 0.
To control for the possibility that Eisenberg and Lanvers (2009) observation that “strong
cases tend to settle; weak ones do not” is also connected to the momentum of settlement, we
include a variable for case strength in our models. Case strength is coded from a case’s complaint and
takes on a value of 1 when plaintiffs argue that undercapitalization is a primary ground for piercing
the corporate veil in the case. Previous work found this factor to be a strong indicator of overall
case strength (Boyd and Hoffman, 2010).
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We also account for the effect that repeat play among attorneys (or the lack thereof) might
have on the pace of a case. Attorneys familiar with one another will be more likely to seek to
maximize shared gains and less likely to posture and exaggerate their positions, meaning that such
repeat players will make settlement more likely (Johnston and Waldfogel, 2002). The same effect
may be present for the timing of settlement. We operationalize the repeat play effect by asking if the
case includes local counsel. Local counsel appear in cases where the controlling lawyers are not
admitted to the bar in the filing jurisdiction, and their role, including performing tasks like certifying
papers, is rather ministerial in nature. Local counsel in the case is thus a proxy for the main
attorneys being strangers to one another and, where present, may well delay case settlement. Local
counsel participation is measured based on the presence of a local counsel listed among the case’s
attorneys or through the presence of a pro hac vice motion, as recorded on the case docket and/or
pleadings.
Many scholars have argued that females communicate and behave differently from males
(Gilligan, 1982), and that this translates to more empathetic and problem solving based judicial
behavior (Brudney et al., 1999; Martin et al., 2002). If female judges do indeed behave consistently
with the gendered theories, when it comes to litigation and case management they may actively
encourage cases to settle, both more frequently and more quickly than their male peers. To control
for this possibility, we include female judge in our models, a variable that is coded as 1 when the
district judge of record is a female.
On the theory that chief district court judges are aware of administrative constraints and are
more likely than their district colleagues to worry about case load reduction pressures (Hettinger et
al., 2006), cases assigned to district court judges with experience as a chief judge (chief judge) may
settle more quickly than other cases. Any time a case has more than one assigned district judge over
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its life, we code this based on the judge at the time of case filing. We retrieved the information on
these judges from the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges.
We also control for a variety of case characteristics. These include whether the case was
removed from state court (removal), what type of nature of suit category the case was classified into
(see Figure 1 for categories), the type of jurisdiction asserted in the complaint (diversity jurisdiction or
federal question jurisdiction), whether there was a jury demand by any party, and whether the case had any
signs of litigation activity (a dichotomous, non-time varying variable indicating the presence of any
substantive or discovery motion in a case).23
3.

Results
Figure 2 provides descriptive details on the distribution of settlement times in our data. The

top panel’s dotted line depicts settlement times in our data from case filing to case settlement for
cases without any recorded litigation activity – such as substantive and discovery motions. For these
cases, the data are positively skewed, with settlement commonly occurring in the very early stages of
the case. This is analogous to the recent findings in Nielsen et al. (2010) regarding early settlement
in some cases. It is also consistent with our expectations regarding early settling, motion-free cases
where the filing of a lawsuit serves as the final bargaining tactic for a plaintiff in already welldeveloped pre-filing negotiations between the two parties.
The solid black line in the top panel of Figure 2 displays just the opposite, showing the
distribution of settlement timing for cases with litigation activity. In these cases, settlement timing
varies greatly, with a relatively even distribution over time. It is in these cases that we expect motion
practice to help foster information exchange and thereby motivate faster settlement. The bottom
panel of Figure 2 depicts, again descriptively, the time to settlement from the filing of the first
substantive motion to the settlement. This figure’s pattern closely resembles non-litigation settlement

20

timing. In other words, the graphical display in the bottom of Figure 2 provides preliminary,
descriptive evidence that in cases with litigation activity, the filing of motions propels cases toward
settlement in a way does not otherwise happen prior to motion filing.
<COMP: Place Figure 2 about here>>

To provide a more concrete statistical test of this settlement timing effect and how it plays out for
our hypotheses, we estimate a series of competing risks regression models. The model, implemented
in STATA 11, yields subhazard ratios. It takes the following form for each observation (case
month) in our data

hj (t | X) = h j, 0(t)exp(X" )

(1)

where j represents competing termination methods in our data (0=censored, 1=settled, 2=other), X
indicates the covariates in!
each of our models (time-varying and fixed), and !!represents the effects
of these covariates. Because of the nature of our time-varying data, our estimates include robust
standard errors (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) and are clustered at the case level to correct for a lack of
independence among these observations.24 Model (1) includes the motions-related variable
necessary for testing Hypothesis 1 (motion made). Model (2) tests Hypothesis 2 with motion granted and
motion denied. Models (3) and (4) test Hypotheses 3 and 4 with plaintiff motion granted and defendant
motion granted and pleading-based motion denied and application of law to fact motion denied, respectively.
Finally, veil piercing motion made and non-veil piercing motion made in Model (5) allow us to test Hypothesis
5. For each of our five models, the chi-squared statistic reaches statistical significance at the p<0.05
level and indicates that we can reject the null hypothesis that our covariates, together, have no effect.
For ease of substantive interpretation, we report the results in these models in Tables 2 and
3 as subhazard ratios, a statistic that is simply the exponential of the estimated coefficient. These
subhazard ratios allow us to quantify the underlying increase (or decrease) in the likelihood of a case
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terminating by settlement in a fixed time after filing due to the added presence of these different
types of motions. In terms of interpretation, a subhazard ratio over 1 indicates that a covariate has a
positive effect on the risk of case settlement while a ratio below 1 indicates a negative effect.
<COMP: Place Table 2 about here>>
<COMP: Place Table 3 about here>>

The statistical significance and signs for the key results reported in the tables for these five
models provide us initial evidence for each of our five hypotheses. As we can see, many of our
motion variables have substantial statistical and substantive effects when it comes to the timing of
case settlement. For example, as indicated in Table 2, Model (1), being in the 2nd+ month
following the filing of a substantive motion increases the odds of settlement by 375% compared to
the chance in that same case prior to the motion being filed. Interestingly, while the odds of a similar
increase in settlement speed are also positive in the first month immediately following the motion
filing, they do not reach statistical significance at the p<0.10 level.
To better describe the substantive effect of motions being filed (2nd+ month), we plot the
Cumulative Incidence Function (CIF) curve of our Model (1) competing risks regression in Figure 3.
The CIF provides the probability of the failure of interest while accounting for the presence of other
competing failures (Coviello and Boggess, 2004; Kim, 2007). Because of the time-varying nature of
our key independent variable in Model (1) (motion filing), we are able to estimate the CIF before and
after a motion is filed (while holding constant all other model variables). We plot the resulting CIF
curves from these two estimates in Figure 3. As we can see there, prior to a motion being filed
(black line), the probability of settlement (our “failure” of interest) remains below 0.10 even as a case
enters its second year. However, once a motion is filed (gray line), we see an immediate uptick in
the slope of the curve and the likelihood of case settlement. This, consistent with Hypothesis 1, is
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evidence of the propelling effect that we expect the filing of motions to have on case settlement
timing.
<COMP: Place Figure 3 about here>>

Now, turning to tests of Hypotheses 2 through 5, we examine this motion effect in a more
fine-grained way. Recall that in Hypothesis 2 we expect that motions granted will have a stronger
effect on settlement timing than those that are denied. As Model (2) in Table 2 reveals, granted
motions have an immediate effect (in the first 30 days after motion disposition), leading to an
increase in the speed of settlement of 270%. A similar immediate effect is not present for denied
motions. However, both granted and denied motions do have substantively important effects on
settlement timing after that first month. Denied motions have a slightly larger effect compared to
granted motions in this context (a 68% increase in settlement odds compared to 54%), but a Wald
test reveals that this difference is not significant.25
For Hypothesis 3, we can see in Model (3), Table 2 that, as expected, the plaintiff’s granted
motions have a stronger effect on settlement timing than those from the defendant. Indeed, in the
first month after a plaintiff’s substantive motion is granted, settlement speed is increased by over
450% (subhazard ratio of 5.538); after the first month of that successful plaintiff motion, the risk of
case settlement increases by a more modest (but still significant) 54%. While positive, neither of the
variables for defendant granted motions reach statistically significant levels.
In the context of Hypothesis 4’s results (found in Table 3’s Model (4)), neither motions
applying law to fact nor pleading-based motions have a statistically significant effect on settlement
timing in the first month after they are denied. After that first month, each type of motion has a
positive effect on settlement timing (subhazard ratios of 1.5 and 1.25, respectively), effects that are
not, statistically speaking, different from one another.26
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Finally, for Hypothesis 5, neither veil piecing motions nor non-veil piercing motions have,
statistically speaking, an immediate effect on case settlement (Table 3, Model (5)). After the first 30
days, however, both types of motions increase the subhazard rate of settlement, with non-veil
piercing motions (a 126% increase in the rate) surprisingly doing so with more heft than those of a
veil piercing nature (a 42% increase).27
Overall, then, we have strong support for two of our five motions-related hypotheses (1 and
3), modest support for Hypothesis 2, and no support for Hypotheses 4 or 5.
Turning briefly to our control variables, we find that some, but not all, have a statistically
significant effect on the time to case settlement. As we observe in Models (1)-(5), discovery motions
rarely have a statistically significant effect on the rate of case settlement and, when they do, that
effect is quite modest compared to the effect of substantive motions (e.g., a 29% increase in
settlement rate in Model (1)). This result, when paired with our theory and findings on substantive
motions, provides an important caveat for previous research linking settlement timing to discovery
practice (e.g., Farber and White, 1991; Huang, 2007).
We also find evidence that the sex of a case’s judge has a positive and statistically significant
effect on settlement timing. In our five models, a female judge’s presence leads to anywhere between
a 40% and 49% increase in settlement rate. While this sizable, consistent, and positive result is not
likely to be surprising to those across fields of study that argue that women leaders and managers are
more effective at fostering an environment of compromise and negotiation than men (Eagly and
Johnson, 1990; Rosenthal, 1998), it does stand in sharp and impressive contrast to the notable
published empirical work in the settlement arena that finds no difference in settlement rates among
cases assigned to male and female judges (Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab, 1995). We hope that
future work will explore this effect, and the theory behind it, in much greater detail.
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We also find, as expected and confirmed in our descriptive results above, that cases without
any litigation activity settle much more quickly than those with it (in each of our five models).28 We
graphically depict this effect in Figure 4 by once again plotting the estimated CIF curve for cases
without any substantive or discovery motions. For sake of simplicity, we estimate this solely for
litigation activity in Model (1). The resulting sharp, rapid uptick in the probability of settlement
depicted in Figure 4 is quite impressive. And, more importantly, when the litigation activity figure is
viewed alongside Figure 3 above, it goes a long way toward confirming our expectation that cases
with and without litigation activity are qualitatively different from one another, particularly when it
comes to information exchange and settlement timing.29 While not filing any motions may be the
fastest route to case settlement, most cases, in our sample and in trial courts more generally, lack the
necessary litigation information to be positioned for this.
<COMP: Place Figure 4 about here>>

We also find that a jury demand is associated with as much as an 18% decrease in the rate of
settlement in a given month in three of our five models, something that may reflect litigation
uncertainty upon filing. Finally, negative, but statistically insignificant, results characterize our local
counsel, case strength, litigant status (entity v. entity), and chief judge control variables. These (non)
results may well indicate that these control variables are not settlement and/or termination-timing
specific. They are not our main focus here, of course, but their performance certainly should prove
intriguing for future work tackling the intricacies of the litigation process and its relation to
settlement.
4.

General Discussion and Limitations
4.1. Discussion
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This study has allowed us to unpack the relationship between post-filing settlements, the
dominant termination method for cases in trial courts today, and the litigation process. Our results
confirm that a key mechanism of formalized litigation – motion practice – can and does influence
settlement and the timing of when it occurs. Our federal district court data enable us to get a unique
picture of the details of litigation and to systematically study the dynamic nature of the whole
process, something that had previously been focused almost exclusively on discovery. Similarly, our
methodology, including competing risks regression models of duration and time-varying motionlevel covariates, allows us to capture the propelling effect that motions made and ruled on can have
on the timing of case settlement.
In summary, our empirical modeling reveals that, as predicted, the filing of a substantive,
non-discovery motion speeds case settlement. In addition, we also find support for our expectations
that motions that are granted are more immediately important to the settlement rate than motions
denied and that plaintiff victories have a more substantial effect than defendant victories. These
findings are substantial in both the direction of their effects and in their size.
Our work further illustrates the importance of continued study of the settlement process.
Theoretical and empirical work on settlement is quite extensive, covering both domestic and foreign
tribunals. Canvassing the literature, we find that researchers’ interest in the subject is largely driven
by two goals. First, scholars seek to learn what factors motivate settlement, which is assumed
(generally) to be a social good that ought to be subsidized. Investigations in this mode have
generally assumed that the parties are passive and that changes in fixed case attributes are the levers
which might be pulled in a more efficient manner. Our work demonstrates that motion practice can
influence the timing of settlement, through unlocking information that the parties and the court
otherwise would not share with one another. While our study provides an important insight on this
subject, we expect that future projects will employ larger, more globally representative, datasets that
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more closely mirror the NOS distributions depicted in black bars in Figure 1 and that deal with a
more diverse set of issues. These future studies could further illustrate the interaction of motion
type, timing, and settlement. As time passes and electronic case resources become more
comprehensive and cheaper to study, this kind of work will be increasingly easy to perform.
Second, scholars seek to learn about settlement because they really wish to know about the
effect of various changes in the legal regime on case outcomes – who is winning and who is losing.
Here, our work on the timing of settlement fits in a recent tradition that notes that early settlements
may result in important distributional consequences for the parties (e.g., Nielsen et al., 2010). Data
on the timing of settlement has the advantage of being relatively easy to collect, unlike information
on how the parties have divided the pie. Our finding that parties can motivate settlement through
their own efforts might help to focus research on new ways of looking at “victory.” For instance, a
settlement that results from party A making and winning a motion might be more likely to be felt
(by A and B) to be A’s “victory” than a settlement that happens absent motion practice.
The analysis of settlement’s timing could also be used to examine the influence of lawyering:
sophisticated lawyers might be extracting more value from litigation (in terms of efficient
compromise) than less sophisticated lawyers, through tactically-timed motion practice. Scholars of
settlement to date have largely discounted these active roles for lawyers and lawyering, preferring to
see both clients and lawyers as passive obstacles to settlement. Employing this framing of the
“problem” of settlement, policymakers have focused on changing the law, or helping judges to learn
techniques, to encourage compromise. But our research suggests that the parties have an important
role to play, and that the structure of the procedural rules in particular might influence the timing of
settlement in unexpected ways.
4.2. Limitations
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While we believe this work makes substantial strides in providing systematic evidence into how the
dynamics of litigation like motion practice can affect settlement, we would be remiss to not mention
a few of its limitations. Most importantly, apart from the causation concerns discussed above, the
dataset is limited to veil piercing cases, and as such is not representative of all federal cases, let alone
all litigation. We see in our dataset proportionately fewer torts, civil rights, and constitutional claims
than the typical federal filing, and proportionately more contract, labor and intellectual property
suits. It is possible that litigation of these commercial disputes is not generalizable to other kinds of
cases, which, in state court in particular, ordinarily resolve a personal injury claim. Settlement in
personal injury cases may be even more strongly driven by attorney agency costs, as large
"settlement mills" control many filings (Engstrom, 2009). This would tend to result in stronger
effects for attorney characteristics, including some that are unobservable on the face of the docket.
Similarly, our dataset is limited in time and scope, with cases filed from 2000 through 2005 and
which had their initial complaints available on Westlaw's PLEADINGS database. While we have no
reason to expect that the latter limitation creates bias, it might be that the introduction of electronic
docketing – when coupled with other products of the digital revolution—has worked a fundamental
change on settlement practice. Certainly, e-discovery has increased the costs of civil litigation,
making settlement an ever-more-attractive alternative to continued litigation. Thus, as compared to
cases filed before digital docketing, our sample might overemphasize the importance of motion
practice in settlement, as settlement is more common today than it used to be (Clermont and
Schwab, 2004; Galanter, 2004).30
At the same time, we observe neither the amount of settlements, nor the demands of the
parties. Previous work found these two factors very important in determining the likelihood and
nature of any eventual compromise (Kaplan et al., 2008; Schwab and Heise, 2011).
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We do not discount these limitations. However, even after considering them, we believe
that our approach advances this area of research by empirically examining the effect of litigation
motion practice, including substantive, non-discovery motions, on the intra-case timing of
settlement. Only through the recent advent of new technologies and an increase in systematic
electronic record-keeping across the federal trial courts have the data utilized for this kind of
dynamic study of litigation become available. As additional technologies, measurements, and
methods continue to emerge, we suspect that future work will be well positioned to continue to
refine this approach and address some of the concerns about our work that we state above.
5.

Conclusion
Cases settle because the parties choose to compromise rather than contest. Until recently,

the content of these settlements was a black box that impeded our understanding of the civil justice
system. It has become clear that “future scholarship on the American civil justice system will
inevitably have to include rigorous work on settlement and settlement behaviors” (Schwab and
Heise, 2011, 934). Through the use of a unique hand-collected dataset of federal trial court cases,
this project helps to illuminate the mechanism of settlement by focusing on the parties’ use of the
litigation process, and particularly motions, to obtain information from one another and the court.
Our most substantial and important finding is that motion practice can spur settlement even in the
absence of a judicial ruling. This in turn suggests that the parties may use the processes of litigation
to exchange information with one another, meaning that procedural rules which discourage motion
practice may also slow settlement. The findings thus reveal a more nuanced, dynamic and reflexive
view of litigation and compromise than that previously reported.
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1

In this paper, we generally use the word “parties” to mean the global unit comprised by the client

and lawyer. We do insert attorney-specific controls in our models. But, generally, we do not explore
how the motion-based learning process we propose is influenced by the peculiarities of the attorneyclient relationship. This area is ripe for further empirical research.
2

A notable exception (outside of the class context) is a consent decree, a settlement document

negotiated by the parties but entered and (potentially) enforced by a judge (Kim et al., 2009).
3

We ignore for the purposes of simplicity those cases that are begun in arbitration or another form

of "alternative" dispute resolution forum.
4

Some suggest that lawyers may reduce the magnitude of irrational party decisions that prevent

settlement (Gilson and Mnookin, 1994; Nielsen et al., 2010). Selection makes this a difficult and
complex topic to study systematically (Huang, 2008).
30

5

The example is stylized because in many cases, automatic disclosures under Rule 26 can result in

discovery before the filing of any motions.
6

The role of motion practice in the emotional landscape of settlement is complex. A lawyer may file

a motion so that a client feels that their story has been told – aggressively – and thereby permit
settlement where otherwise the client would have wished to continue to fight. But the filing of such
aggressive motions might at the same time spark negative emotions in their targets, and thereby
depress the likelihood of compromise. Regardless of the particular emotional valence of a motion,
the control enabled by motion practice generally increases litigant happiness with dispute resolution
(Lind and Tyler, 1988).
7

Suggestively, a recent large scale study of federal civil litigation found that “40% of cases with

[mooted motions to dismiss] settle[d] or were voluntary dismissed” (Institute, 2009, 49).
8

Bronsteen (2007) argues that parties routinely delay settlement until after summary judgment, with

defendants in particular hoping for “an opportunity to win without the risk of losing.” Bronsteen’s
argument rests on a number of assumptions, and crucially models only three moments to resolve
cases: early (before motion practice), after summary judgment, and at trial. As a reviewer
alternatively suggests, there is a possible drag on the timing effect. In some cases, the progression of
time (and related case activity) will have excavated most of the important information, so that when
the case proceeds to dispositive motions post-discovery, settlement timing will not receive nearly as
much of a boost from the motion practice. In such cases, earlier motions will be more surprising –
and thus more informative. To the extent that this information-saturation hypothesis is correct, it
would tend to dampen observed effects.
9

Certain judge demographic characteristics are unlikely to raise these concerns, as judge assignment

at the district court level occurs after filing and approximates randomness. However, attributes, like
judge sex and race, cannot be manipulated (Holland, 1986; Boyd, Epstein, and Martin, 2010).
31

10

We must also consider the possibility of omitted variable bias – i.e., the presence of a third

variable that is causing both the filing of a motion and, shortly thereafter, a settlement (Clarke,
2005). Within our analyses, we are unable to imagine such a systematically omitted and biasing
variable. A far-fetched possibility would be for the defendant's insurance carrier to make paying off
a settlement contingent on a particular litigation strategy – for example, the filing of a motion to
dismiss. Obviously, this is not common practice.
11

We thank an anonymous reviewer for noting this important difference.

12

Why is it that the same selection story isn't confounding for nondiscovery motions? In one sense,

it is: cases in which motions are filed are qualitatively different from cases without litigation activity
– the parties did not cooperate sufficiently prior to filing to make a fast, motion-free settlement
possible. But for cases in which motions are present, if substantive motions were to be associated
with cases that are more difficult to settle, we'd expect and observe negative, not positive effects for
motion activity.
13

Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database has coverage beginning in 2000 and includes “selected

pleadings, complaints, and answers filed in state and federal courts.” Westlaw, Pleadings database
content,
http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=PLEADING&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WL
W10.03&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=Westlaw&MST= (last visited October 5, 2010).
While we readily admit that our reliance on Westlaw’s Trial Pleadings Database to identify a
sampling population limits our ability to speak to or sample from the true underlying population of
veil piercing related complaints filed in federal courts, we do have reason to believe that the
Westlaw-drawn data do allow us to get as close as is practical given lingering complaint-level data
availability constraints. As we have previously described,
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[C]onversations with Westlaw research representatives indicate that for veil piercing cases,
this database covers or nearly covers the universe of federal claims. In particular, although
not for specific attribution, a Westlaw representative with supervisory responsibilities over
the PLEADINGS database said that it was designed to collect all federal complaints since
2000 that lawyers litigating commercial cases would have a plausible interest in learning
about. Thus, PLEADINGS may exclude civil rights cases, or habeas petitions, or family
disputes, but attempts to collect every tort, contract, or federal statutory claim brought
against corporate defendants. With respect to State complaints, which may or may not be
electronically filed, West currently collects material from larger urban centers, and
consequently does not have comprehensive records from smaller jurisdictions (Boyd and
Hoffman, 2010).
14

There are 18 federal district courts with no cases represented in our final data, including: Central

District of Illinois, District of Alaska, District of Guam, District of Idaho, District of Hawaii,
District of Montana, District of New Mexico, District of North Dakota, District of Northern
Mariana Islands, District of Puerto Rico, District of Rhode Island, District of the Virgin Islands,
Eastern District of Oklahoma, Middle District of Tennessee, Western District of Arkansas, Western
District of Kentucky, Western District of Tennessee, and Western District of Texas.
15

In the Westlaw pleadings database, we ran the following search: (“alter ego liability” or pier! /s

corpor! /s veil or “unity of interest” or (corpor! /s (facade or shell or sham or undercapitalized
conduit)) and da(aft 01/01/2000) and da(bef 01/01/2006)) to identify these veil piercing related
cases.
Our search yielded just under 900 unique and usable federal district court veil-piercing cases.
Prior to commencing our collection of data for these cases, we randomly ordered them, after which
we conducted our data collection for cases in that assigned order. This randomization allowed us to
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cease coding and turn to analysis when our research resources and time necessitated it, something
that for us came after fully coding 697 cases – i.e., 78% of the Westlaw Pleadings Database’s
population.
16

We exclude cases that result in a default judgment for three reasons. First, in such cases typically

the defendant has not shown up at all, and there is no possibility for information exchange or
settlement in the formal litigation process. Second, such cases typically proceed without any nondefault judgment-related motions. Finally, from talking with practitioners, we also learned that many
of the veil piercing default judgments in our dataset were filed by labor unions against small painting
contractors, whose personal bank accounts were to be attached after the default (for failing to
contribute to pension plans) issued. We concluded that including these cases made little sense in a
general study of litigation.
We exclude cases terminated via bankruptcy, remand, and transfer, since, while they did
“terminate” in a district court, they did not do so with any finality, making their inclusion in our
competing risks modeling as either “ongoing and censored” or “terminated but not settled” as
troubling. Finally, for those cases with lengthy, non-terminal stays (10+ months), our timingfocused modeling is unable to account for the stoppage in case activity, which in our cases was
nearly always occurring so that bankruptcy proceedings could commence elsewhere. While we
believe that the exclusion of all of these cases is empirically and theoretically justified, their inclusion
would not alter the primary conclusions yielded from our regression analyses.
17

As we note below, while we are concerned with settled cases in this study, our modeling strategy

accounts for settled and non-settled cases to prevent any bias that might occur from focusing solely
on the former.
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18

Our data collection from these documents focuses on case and party information that is critical to

understanding the evolution of piercing and non-piercing claims and the outcome of those claims in
a case.
19

An alternative modeling technique would be to focus exclusively on the settled cases in our data.

Setting aside the dependency and selection bias concerns noted above, this is a technique used by
others in the field studying the “pace of litigation” and how it applies specifically to settlement
timing (Spurr, 1997; Fenn and Rickman, 1999). While we believe that the competing risks approach
better accounts for the overall methodological concerns of our data, modeling our data in this
traditional way (settled cases only) using a Cox Regression Model changes very little regarding the
significance of our key covariates. Full results of these alternative models are available upon request.
20

Our modeling strategy accounts for the dependencies that are present in our expanded data by

clustering the robust standard errors on individual cases.
21

We compare two "denied" motions here (as compared to Hypothesis 2, which contrasts granted

and denied motions). We do so because granted motions may terminate the case entirely, leaving no
possibility for settlement. In Hypothesis 3, we are interested in comparing the propelling effect
toward settlement of different kinds of motions.
22

Unlike Hadfield (2005), who found that individuals suing organizational defendants are less likely

to settle than organizations suing organizations, we focus only the timing to settlement in cases.
Given the nature of our dataset, there are almost no cases in which an individual is the sole
defendant.
23

As we describe in further detail below, our models also include an interaction of litigation activity

with the log of our dependent variable, an inclusion designed to correct for nonproportionality in
litigation activity.
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24

In supplemental models not reported in the text but available upon request, we also estimated

shared frailty models to account for possible within-circuit correlations in settlement environments.
Equivalent to random effects in the non-survival analysis setting, this modeling technique effectively
groups the data by circuit and results in estimated hazards that are conditional on this frailty (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones, 2004). These models do not reveal any statistically significant withincircuit correlations. While it might also be fruitful to model the frailty at the district level, because of
the size of our dataset and since some of our districts contain so few cases, attempted shared frailty
models at the district level fail to converge.
25

Chi-squared 0.18, p=0.67

26

Chi-squared 0.58, p=0.45

27

A Wald test of these differences reveals that we can reject the null hypothesis that the effect of

later-term non-veil piercing motions on settlement timing is equal to the effect of later-term veil
piercing motions. Chi-squared 7.79, p<0.05.
28

A key assumption of the competing risks model is that of proportional subhazards or, in other

words, that the effect of modeled covariates, within individual observations, are consistent across
time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004). We find evidence that our litigation activity variable is
nonproportional. To correct for this, we follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2001)
and Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004) and the example of Meinke (2005) and Brooks (2005) and
include an additional term in our models (the interaction of litigation activity with the log of our
time variable) that then allows us to proceed and assess the direct effects in our modeling. The
appropriate interpretation of our large, positive, and statistically significant interactive term is that
the negative effect of litigation activity sharply grows over time in a case. In other words, this
indicates that for cases with litigation activity in them, the hazard rate of settlement over time is
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much lower (and increasingly so) than it is for cases without any litigation activity at all. This can be
informally visually observed by contrasting Figure 3's CIF curves with the CIF curve in Figure 4.
We also note that alternative modeling excluding this interaction (not reported in the text) yields
essentially the same results that we have presented in the manuscript (but does not afford us the
confidence of having corrected for nonproportionality).
29

In supplementary analyses not reported here, we estimated our five models after excluding cases

without litigation activity altogether. While the size of the effects for our hypotheses’ variables
change slightly, none of the overall results are altered. The results from these analyses are available
from the authors upon request.
30

That said, it is not obvious why this bias would have any effect on the relationship of motions and

the timing of settlement.
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Data Summary Statistics
Variable
Motion made
Motion granted
Motion denied
Plaintiff motion granted
Defendant motion granted
Application of law to fact motion
denied
Pleading-based motion denied
Veil piercing motion made
Non-veil piercing motion made
Discovery motion
Entity v. entity
Case strength (undercapitalization)
Local counsel participation
Female judge
Chief judge
Jury demand
Litigation activity present
Removed from state court
Diversity jurisdiction
Issue areas
Settled
Involuntarily dismissed
Summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law
Trial verdict
Censored
(ongoing on August 18, 2008)
Months of survival (mean)
Survival time range

Distribution
In Cases
59%
13%
34%
6%
8%
14%
20%
33%
33%
18%
10%
24%
29%
23%
24%
62%
63%
11%
45%
See Figure 1
77%
8%
7%
3%
5%
17 months
1-58 months

Table 1: Summary statistics of key variables in database. Percentages
listed are computed from the 585 cases in our database used in our
analysis (see footnote 16 for details on excluded cases).
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Model (1)

Motion made (1st month)
Motion made (2nd+ mth)
Motion granted (1st month)
Motion granted (2nd+ mth)
Motion denied (1st month)
Motion denied (2nd+ mth)
Plaintiff mot. granted
(1st month)
Plaintiff mot. granted
(2nd+ mth)
Defendant mot. granted
(1st month)
Defendant mot. granted
(2nd+ month)
Discovery motion (1st month)
Discovery motion (2nd+ mth)
Entity v. Entity
Case Strength
Local Counsel Participation
Female Judge
Chief District Judge
Jury Demand
Litigation Activity
ln(time) x Litigation Activity
Issue Area Controls
Jurisdiction &
Removal Controls
Log Likelihood
Chi-Squared
Observations
Cases
Failures via Settlement
Competing Failures
Censored

Subhazard
Ratio
1.973
4.748**

Model (2)

Robust
SE
(1.06)
(1.11)

Subhazard
Ratio

3.704**
1.540**
0.778
1.682**

0.456
1.294*
0.847
0.949
0.909
1.395**
0.961
0.842*
0.007**
3.106**
Included

(0.45)
(0.19)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.00)
(0.61)

0.353
1.175
0.844
0.954
0.877
1.427**
0.926
0.838*
0.018**
3.244**
Included

Included
-2483.11
243.59**
9931
585
452
104
29

Included
-2500.173
217.46**
9931
585
452
104
29

Robust
SE

Model (3)
Subhazard
Ratio

Robust
SE

(1.42)
(0.27)
(0.35)
(0.23)

(0.35)
(0.17)
(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.61)

5.538**

(2.77)

1.542*

(0.35)

1.286

(0.91)

1.216
0.356
1.158
0.849
0.966
0.89
1.440**
0.944
0.849
0.015**
3.761**
Included

(0.24)
(0.35)
(0.17)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.70)

Included
-2506.625
203.93**
9931
585
452
104
29

Table 2: Competing Risks Regression Results for Models (1)-(3). ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Baseline variables are contract cases, those
where an individual is involved in the litigation as either a defendant or a plaintiff, and federal question jurisdiction. Standard
errors are robust and are clustered on individual cases.
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Model (4)
Subhazard
Ratio
Applic. of law to fact motion denied
(1st month)
Applic. of law to fact motion denied
(2nd+ month)
Pleading-based mot. denied (1st month)
Pleading-based mot. denied
(2nd+ month)
Veil piercing motion (1st month)
Veil piercing motion (2nd+ month)
Non-veil piercing mot. (1st month)
Non-veil piercing mot. (2nd+ month)
Discovery motion (1st month)
Discovery motion (2nd+ month)
Entity v. Entity
Case Strength
Local Counsel Participation
Female Judge
Chief District Judge
Jury Demand
Litigation Activity
ln(time) x Litigation Activity
Issue Area Controls
Jurisdiction & Removal Controls
Log Likelihood
Chi-Squared
Observations
Cases
Failures via Settlement
Competing Failures
Censored

Robust
SE

0.734

(0.45)

1.506**
0.734

(0.31)
(0.52)

1.249*

(0.16)

0.339
1.144
0.836
0.968
0.888
1.398**
0.921
0.858
0.018**
3.511**
Included
Included
-2510.156
178.81**
9931
585
452
104
29

Model (5)

(0.34)
(0.17)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.15)
(0.10)
(0.09)
(0.01)
(0.66)

Subhazard
Ratio

0.878
1.420**
0.487
2.255**
0.42
1.321*
0.817
0.983
0.906
1.487**
0.949
0.821**
0.013**
3.314**
Included
Included
-2495.99
223.02**
9931
585
452
104
29

Robust
SE

(0.51)
(0.19)
(0.49)
(0.31)
(0.42)
(0.20)
(0.13)
(0.11)
(0.09)
(0.16)
(0.10)
(0.08)
(0.01)
(0.65)

Table 3: Competing Risks Regression Results for Models (4)-(5). ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Baseline variables are contract cases,
those where an individual is involved in the litigation as either a defendant or a plaintiff, and federal question jurisdiction.
Standard errors are robust and are clustered on individual cases.
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Figure 1: The distribution of Nature of Suit (NOS) codes, by broad category, in our data and for all cases filed in federal
district courts in 2007. Data on 2007 filing distributions accumulated from Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, March 31, 2007. Data on NOS categorization derived from Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER).
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Figure 2: Proportion of all settling cases in our data that terminate in a given month of a case. The top panel depicts these
times from case filing while the bottom panel does so from the filing of a case’s first substantive motion.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Incidence Function curves for the changing values of the motion filed (2+ month) variable in Model
(1). Other variables in the model are held at their mean and modal values.
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Figure 4: Cumulative Incidence Function curve for Model (1) when litigation activity is set to 0. Other variables in the
model are held at their mean and modal values.
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